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The Dignity and Advancement of Bacon 
By JESSE H. SHERA 
TT'RANCIS B A C O N denied the circulation 
of the blood, didn't understand the 
work of Galileo, rejected Gilbert on 
magnetism and Copernicus on the sun. 
He was not a scientist, but a lawyer, a 
practical politician, and a man of let-
ters; he created no new science, but 
preached a new philosophy—though by 
William Harvey it was disparaged as the 
work of one "who writes philosophy like 
a Lord Chancellor." By which he meant, 
one may assume, that there was a certain 
amount of "ham" in Bacon. In every 
sense he was a child of his age; his con-
temporaneousness doubtless stems from 
the fact that today we are all Elizabethans 
at heart. 
Yet Bacon was nothing if not a prophet, 
the bellwether of a new generation of 
scientists. He envisaged a world per-
fected by a reformed science, and though 
he made no striking or successful experi-
ment contributing any important fact 
to man's store of natural knowledge, with 
conscious power and statesmanlike elo-
quence he gave authentic voice to a 
philosophy of inductive science unim-
agined by others who were, in reality, 
better scientists than he. 
There was in Bacon's philosophy the 
spirit of adventure, even as in the ex-
ploits of Hakluyt, Drake, and Raleigh. 
Like Galileo, Tartaglia, Descartes, and 
Newton, he strove for the emancipation 
of physical doctrine from the presupposi-
tions of scholastic ontology and espoused 
epistemology as the rational highway to 
the goal of all natural science. "It is 
idle," he wrote, "to expect any great ad-
vancement in science from the super-in-
ducing and grafting of new things upon 
old. We begin anew from the very foun-
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dations, unless we would revolve forever 
in a circle, with mean and contemptible 
progress." 
Bacon saw the realities of the universe 
as a self-contained whole and argued that 
the phenomena (or instances) compris-
ing this totality must be assembled, ex-
amined, weighted against each other, and 
evaluated before the scientist dared in-
dulge in generalization. He recognized 
that the doctrines of the Schoolmen were 
both outgrown and outworn, and in his 
view facts were the urgent need of his 
time; he defined a fact as "the unmask-
ing of nature." So inane did he find the 
corpus of received philosophy that he 
saw no hope but in rejecting it entirely 
and substituting a new learning. Induc-
tion, he thought, would redress the 
empty rationalism of Scholastic science, 
which began with principles and de-
ducted consequences; the new science 
would begin with facts derived from 
observation and experiment, progressing 
through successive steps to the formula-
tion of a general principle. "From the 
gathering of countless grapes, ripe and 
in season," the wine of science would 
llow. 
Nature itself, he maintained, does not 
lie. The source of all error is the impurity 
of the human mind, and the main func-
tion of eliminative induction is (for 
Bacon as for Aristotle) to assist in puri-
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fication of the intellect. Certain obstacles, 
which Bacon called "idols," render the 
mind inhospitable to innovation. Ready 
acceptance as truth of that which one 
wishes to be true; predisposition to in-
dividual prejudice and error; unfit choice 
of words, obscuring rather than clarify-
ing the understanding; reliance on the 
authority of an obsolete systematic dogma 
inherited from medieval philosophy; the 
intellectual sterility and circularity of 
Scholastic "logic"; these were the "idols" 
that condemned the dignity and worth 
of human learning to languish in fu-
tility. The mind must be meticulously 
purged of all "anticipations," prejudices, 
and "idols" if it is to be prepared to 
comprehend the true essence of phe-
nomena. 
Synthesis of this "essence of phe-
nomena" distills a totality of collected 
facts into the aforementioned wine of 
scientific truth. However, science cannot 
be distilled from uninterpreted sense ex-
perience, however assiduously the grapes 
of fact are gathered, sorted, and pressed. 
Bacon's progress toward truth via ob-
servation and experimentation left him 
stranded on the siding of positivism, for 
that which appears at first blush to be 
honest fact may later be shown to be 
nothing more than another "idol." Sci-
ence does not advance solely by means of 
perceptual experience, nor is it served 
because man is making ever better use 
of his senses. Bold ideas, unjustified an-
ticipations, and speculative thought must 
be hazarded if the scientist is to win his 
prize. 
C H O I C E AND J U D G M E N T 
Facts and phenomena are infinite in 
number, and the scientist must choose 
from those he discovers the few which 
may be relevant to his purpose. This ex-
ercise of choice is, of course, an act of 
judgment; and judgment formation is 
impossible without a theoretical frame 
of reference. The inductive verification 
of a theory implies a much more compli-
cated process than empiricism in its 
usual form admits. Even the simplest 
determination of a physical fact implies 
a whole complex of theoretical state-
ments and is significant only in relation 
to them. If science is to be realistic and 
orderly, empirical and rational methods 
must complement each other at every 
step; the theoretical can never be sepa-
rated from the factual into a dichotomy. 
Bacon's experirnentum cruris was im-
possible; he stumbled about in a world 
of isolated instances, unrelated particu-
lars, and colorful but disorderly experi-
ments, until the facts themselves exacted 
their own ironic penalty—he died as the 
result of exposure suffered when he left 
his carriage to stuff a chicken with snow 
in order to test the effect of low tem-
peratures upon the rate of putrefaction. 
Like any philosopher who distrusts 
abstraction, Bacon was driven by his in-
ductive method to the use of classifica-
tion as an instrument for ordering the 
world, a necessary prerequisite to the 
progress of human knowledge. Antici-
pating Locke's belief that ultimately all 
our ideas are the product of sensation, 
he adopted a psychological Gestalt for 
his classification and set forth, in the 
Latin (1623) edition of The Dignity and 
Advancement of Learning, the details of 
a scheme based on three human "facul-
ties." "For sense, which is the door of 
the intellect," he wrote," is affected by 
individual objects only. The images of 
those individuals—that is, the impres-
sions received by the senses—are fixed 
in the memory, and pass into it, in the 
first instance, entire as it were, just as 
they occur. These the human mind pro-
ceeds to review and ruminate on; and, 
thereupon, either simply rehearses them, 
or makes fanciful imitations of them, or 
analyzes and classifies them. Therefore, 
from these three fountains—Memory, 
Imagination, and Reason—flow these 
three emanations—History, Poesy, and 
Philosophy; and there can be no others." 
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By ordering his classification upon 
man's cognitive power, Bacon gave full-
est voice to his belief in the unity of all 
knowledge, which was organized for use 
into a configuration resembling the 
horns of Pan, broad at the base and 
pointed at the top, as all nature may be 
said to rise to a point. The individuals 
or instances comprising the base are in-
finite, but they may be collected into 
manifold species, which coalesced into 
genera which, by continued synthesis, 
progressed through more nearly univer-
sal generalities toward nature's natural 
end, unity. Its divisions, Bacon said, "are 
like branches of a tree that meet in 
one stem." The trunk represented one 
universal science, Bacon's Philosophia 
Prima, "which stem grows for some dis-
tance entire and continuous before it 
divides itself into arms and boughs." 
This great mother of all the sciences was 
"a receptacle for all such axioms as are 
not peculiar to any of the particular 
sciences, but belong to several of them 
in common." The body of these axioms 
he described as "displaying the unity of 
nature," and it was identification and 
demonstration of this unity that com-
prised the true office of Philosophia 
Prima. 
Bacon's insistence upon the unity of 
science and learning has its obvious 
counterpart in the Hellenic belief in 
universal Sapience, and the Greeks 
linked the chain of the sciences into a 
Circle of Learning. But it imposed se-
vere restrictions by drawing an absolute 
line of demarcation between the realm 
of the divine and the world of nature. 
Science was left with only the natural, 
hence its concern was limited to matter 
—the natural and physical sciences. But 
Bacon did not regard the speculative 
and the operational aspects of science as 
two kinds of knowledge, but rather as 
two professions or occupations operating 
with the same body of knowledge; one 
being concerned with an inquiry into 
causes, the other working toward the 
production of effects. 
B A C O N ' S D E B T TO A R I S T O T L E 
Though Bacon's scheme for the par-
titioning of knowledge differed both 
fundamentally and in detail from those 
of his predecessors, its debt to Aristotle 
is apparent in several of its subordinate 
categories, and the Stoic Triad, as well 
as the Trivium and Quadrivium of the 
Scholastic curriculum are not quite con-
cealed within it. Bacon separated civil 
from natural history, laying the foun-
dation for a separation of science and 
philosophy—to him, civil history em-
braced all human affairs and natural 
history encompassed all the facts of na-
ture. Perhaps he saw his classification as 
a framework within which he could set 
forth his observations and criticisms re-
specting each separate branch of knowl-
edge and his proposals for remedying 
the deficiencies of the learning of his 
day. However, at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century the time was ripe 
for radical reform of the sciences—four 
centuries earlier another Bacon, Roger, 
had sought to define knowledge in terms 
of what men can do instead of what 
hypotheses they can formulate, but his 
impatience with Scholastic subtleties 
came a little too soon. 
The errors in Francis Bacon's psychol-
ogy, leading him to conclude that the 
mind operates in discrete water-tight 
compartments, that memory is confined 
to history, that history itself is no more 
than the recall of facts, that reason 
and imagination are opposing extremes, 
need not concern us here—after all, it 
was in the practical world of commerce, 
industry, agriculture, navigation, and 
court politics, rather than in the world 
of the mind, that Bacon felt most confi-
dent. However, like Samuel Johnson's 
preaching woman, Bacon's psychology is 
remarkable, not because it is faulty, but 
because it is psychology at all. 
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The doctrine of the unity of knowl-
edge, however imperfectly conceived in 
detail, had a special significance for the 
early seventeenth century. Bacon's classi-
fication not only helped to prepare the 
way for the enlightenment of the next 
century, but it also established a sys-
tematic plan of organization adopted by 
the authors and compilers of the dic-
tionaries and encyclopedias which came 
to play such an important role in the 
dissemination of scholarship. "If we 
emerge from this vast operation," wrote 
Diderot in announcing his plans for a 
great French encyclopedia, "we shall 
owe it mainly to the Chancellor Bacon, 
who sketched the plan of an universal 
dictionary of sciences and arts at a time 
when there were not, so to speak, either 
arts or sciences. This extraordinary gen-
ius, when it was impossible to write a 
history of what men already knew, wrote 
one of that which they had to learn." 
Certainly it was the decision by Diderot 
and D'Alembert to make use of Bacon's 
system as the framework for their monu-
mental synthesis of eighteenth century 
scholarship that firmly established Sir 
Francis as the supreme authority on clas-
sification. 
U N I V E R S A L L Y A D O P T E D 
T o the close of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and even almost to the present 
time, Bacon's tri-partite division of 
knowledge has remained unchallenged 
(except by Brunet) as the pattern to be 
followed by bibliographers and librar-
ians in England, France, and especially 
in Italy. Rhodius, Clemens, Naude, 
Bouillaud, and Garnier all employed the 
Baconian triad, with modifications. On 
this side of the Atlantic, Thomas Jeffer-
son adopted the Baconian scheme for 
the organization of his own library, and 
when his books were sold to the United 
States government after the War of 1812, 
his classification (based on Bacon's) was 
accepted as the organization plan for 
the Library of Congress and remained 
in use until shortly after 1900, when the 
present system was devised by Martel 
and Hanson. Thaddeus Mason Harris, 
when librarian of Harvard College, used 
Bacon, as modified by Diderot and 
D'Alembert, for the ordering of his list 
of titles recommended for purchase by 
the small association libraries springing 
up along the Atlantic coast and in the 
Middle West during the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. But, of 
course, it was Melvil Dewey's use of the 
"inverted Baconian" of William Torrey 
Harris for the general plan of the Dewey 
decimal system that established Bacon 
as the strongest single influence in bib-
liographic organization. And the adop-
tion of the Dewey pattern by the Inter-
national Institute of Bibliography for its 
universal decimal classification gave the 
Baconian influence an almost impregna-
ble position throughout the world. For 
better or for worse, librarians and bibli-
ographers will probably suffer with Ba-
con for a good many generations more. 
The popularity of Bacon's schemes for 
bibliographic purposes is easily under-
stood, for it is simple in concept, flexi-
ble, and readily applicable to practical 
situations. Philosophically, it rests on 
two assumptions: first, that books, being 
products of the mind, a scheme that de-
rives from human faculties would seem 
to be particularly appropriate for their 
organization; and second, that books are 
themselves "facts," "instances," or en-
tities, and therefore it must follow that 
the construction of a bibliographic clas-
sification is in itself a manifestation of 
the inductive process from which a tax-
onomic ordering will emerge. That such 
reasoning misconstrued the purpose of 
bibliographic organization, not to say 
the character of the book, is beside the 
point. Bacon, when he devised his sys-
tem, had no notion that it would ever 
be used to order books in a library or 
entries in a bibliography. Librarians, on 
the other hand, have made use of what-
ever was readily available to them, and 
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the Baconian triad seemed to meet their 
needs. Librarians have always been a 
practical breed, too often painfully so, 
not much given to thoughtful contem-
plation of the philosophical considera-
tions that underlie their craft. 
B A C O N ' S C O N T R I B U T I O N S A P P R A I S E D 
In the final analysis, then, how does 
one appraise the contribution of this 
fascinatingly complex man? 
Bacon's perception of the intellectual 
bankruptcy of Scholasticism, and the im-
perfections of its method, led him to set 
forth ideas which dramatized the widen-
ing intellectual breach that separated 
his day from the Middle Ages. He in-
vested science with a civic dimension 
which made it a comfortable democratic 
doctrine within which could develop a 
vocation for the betterment of man's 
estate that was not the monopoly of an 
aristocracy, either of birth or mentality, 
but could be shared by all. In the clarity 
and vigor with which he denounced the 
older philosophies, he stood above his 
less articulate contemporaries, though 
he preached much more successfully 
than he practiced. 
Though he failed to recognize that the 
delicate process of observation is inti-
mately interrelated to the philosophical 
atmosphere within which it is conducted, 
he did recognize, perhaps better than 
any other of his day, the extreme diffi-
culties inherent in any attempt to ascer-
tain accurately the facts of nature. T o a 
striking degree he anticipated John 
Locke's belief that all human ideas are 
ultimately the product of sensation. This 
concept was not only implicit in the 
Novum Organum, but was the very 
foundation of his system of classification. 
Thus in the "practical" orientation of 
his philosophy, reinforced a half-century 
later by Locke's Essay Concerning Hu-
man Understanding, Bacon can properly 
be regarded as the progenitor of cer-
tain characteristically English schools of 
thought in psychology which have pro-
foundly affected the course of scientific 
inquiry. 
It was, however, in his attitude toward 
the importance of language and com-
munication that his ideas seem most 
astonishingly modern. His "Idols of the 
Market-Place" anticipated today's gen-
eral semantics: "men believe that their 
reason governs words . . . , but it is also 
true that words react on the understand-
ing." He presaged modern linguistics by 
pointing out the errors arising from the 
tendency to hypostatize language (that 
is, through words to attribute reality to 
that which does not exist), and the fail-
ure to recognize the open texture of 
language (that is, that words can be so 
confused and ill-defined that they can 
destroy rather than promote human 
communication). Thus, he arrived at the 
conclusion that a familiar word may 
have no definition which rightly fixes its 
meaning. As he said, the word is "a mark 
loosely and confusedly applied to denote 
a variety of actions which will not bear 
to be reduced to any consistent mean-
ing," and thus to know its use fully, one 
must turn not only to definition, but 
also to the ways in which it is employed. 
Here, indeed, were germs of linguistic 
concepts that gave rise to such divergent 
twentieth century analyses as those of 
Whorf, Charles Morris, Korzybski, and 
others. 
Also, in the sixth book of the English 
version of the De Augmentis, Bacon in-
quired into the capacity of "discourse," 
both written and oral, to convey the 
thought of one man to another. Here, 
especially in his treatment of ciphers and 
other non-vernacular forms of communi-
cation, he considered the transmission of 
information in ways that are strikingly 
suggestive of the problems of modern 
documentation, information theory, and 
symbolic logic, even hinting at Cyber-
netics. 
Furthermore, in the first edition of the 
Advancement, in the Novum Organum, 
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and in the New Atlantis, Bacon urged 
the association of scientists in coopera-
tive exploration of natural phenomena, 
paying little heed to theory and none 
whatever to traditional philosophizing. 
That his vision inspired the founders of 
the Royal Society is evident from the 
testimony of Locke, Boyle, and the first 
officers of that organization who frankly 
regard themselves as his disciples. Ad-
mittedly, they were so fired by the Ba-
conian enthusiasm for the inductive 
method that they were too filled with 
the wonders of nature, too preoccupied 
with the practical utility of what they 
were doing, and too impatient with the 
dull routines of systematic inquiry, to 
subject themselves to the rigorous self-
discipline that is the hallmark of the 
true scientist. Yet in the spell cast over 
these brilliant young men who heralded 
the dawn of a new scientific age is to be 
found the germ of today's cooperative, 
or team, research. Bacon underestimated 
the task of exploring all the phenomena 
of nature, there can be no doubt about 
that; but he knew that it was a big job 
and that it could never be brought 
to successful completion by individual 
scholars working in isolation. There may 
have been more truth in Harvey's jibe 
than he realized, for what seventeenth 
century science seems to have needed 
most was a "Lord Chancellor." Perhaps 
this was Bacon's greatest contribution of 
all, that after four hundred years he can, 
to paraphrase his own words, still "ring 
the bell which calls the wits together." 
Photocopying by Libraries 
T h e following pertinent statement concerning photocopying by libraries is taken from 
the July 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. 
Copyright Law, pp. 25-26: 
The Problem 
" T h e application of the principle of fair use to the making of a photocopy by a library 
for the use of a person engaged in research is an important question which merits special 
consideration. T h i s question has not been decided by the courts, and it is uncertain how 
far a library may go in supplying a photocopy of copyrighted material in its collections. 
Many libraries and researchers feel that this uncertainty has hampered research and should 
be resolved to permit the making of photocopies for research purposes to the fullest extent 
compatible with the interests of copyright owners." 
Recommendations 
" T h e statute should permit a library whose collections are available to the public with-
out charge to supply a single photocopy of copyrighted material in its collections to any 
applicant under the following conditions: 
"(a) A single photocopy of one article in any issue of a periodical, or a reasonable part 
of any other publication, may be supplied when the applicant states in writing that he 
needs and will use such material solely for his own research. 
"(b) A single photocopy of an entire publication may be supplied when the applicant 
also states in writing, and the library is not otherwise informed, that a copy is not available 
from the publisher. 
"(c) Where the work bears a copyright notice, the library should be required to affix to 
the photocopy a warning that the material appears to be copyrighted." 
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